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Implementation of Housing Rights in South Africa: Approaches
and Strategies
LILIAN CHENWI
Assurer un accès adéquat au logement, en particulier pour les personnes défavorisées
et désavantagées de la société, y compris celles qui font face à des expulsions et des
déplacements, constitue un défi global constant. La situation demeure critique en
Afrique du Sud, où plusieurs ménages vivent dans des conditions difficiles, faisant
face au risque d’expulsion et au manque d’accès à un logement adéquat. Cela est le
cas malgré la kyrielle de lois, de jurisprudence, de politiques et de programmes qui
existent en Afrique du Sud, en matière de logement. Nonobstant les défis auxquels le
pays fait face relativement au fait d’assurer la mise en œuvre adéquate du droit au
logement, tel que le démontre le présent article, nous pouvons tirer des leçons de ses
approches et stratégies de mise en œuvre.
Ensuring access to adequate housing, especially for the poor and disadvantaged in
society, including those faced with evictions and displacement, continues to be a
global challenge. The situation remains critical in South Africa, with many poor
households living in difficult conditions, facing the risk of eviction and unable to
access adequate housing. This is despite the myriad of progressive housing laws,
jurisprudence, policies and programs that exist in South Africa. Notwithstanding the
challenges that the country faces in ensuring the effective realization of the right to
adequate housing, as illustrated in this article, lessons can be learnt from its
approaches and strategies to implement this right.

THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE against the negative effects caused by homelessness on their
livelihoods and well-being is at the core of the right to housing.1 Recognition and effective
implementation of this right is therefore vital to improved well-being, better livelihoods and
in strengthening the enjoyment of human rights. South Africa is hailed for its progressive
housing laws, jurisprudence, policies and programmes. The country’s housing policy and
strategy is aimed at transforming “the extremely fragmented, complex and racially based
South African human settlement environment.”2 Apartheid laws and policies contributed to
this fragmented and racially based human settlement environment, especially as they
facilitated, among other things, unequal approaches to housing for each race group and the
eviction3 and relocation of people to racially defined areas. The vision of the current housing


Lilian Chenwi is an Associate Professor at the School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa.
This is a revised version of a paper prepared for the Symposium on A Road to Home: The Right to Housing in
Canada and Around the World (24 October 2013) / A Road to Home: The Right 2 Housing Coalition Session
(25 October 2013), held in Toronto, Canada.
1

Sandra Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (Cape Town:
Juta, 2010) at 270 [Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights].
2
Department of Human Settlements, Annual Report 2012-2013 (2013) at 18, RP165/2013, online: Department
of Human Settlements <http://www.dhs.gov.za/sites/default/files/annual_reports/DHS_Annual_Report_201213_FULL_DOCUMENT.pdf> [Department of Human Settlements].
3
The word eviction bears a corresponding meaning to the word “evict” as stipulated in one of South Africa’s
legislation on eviction, the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act No 19 of
1998 (“PIE Act”). The Act provides in section 1 that “‘evict’ means to deprive a person of occupation of a
building or structure, or the land on which such building or structure is erected, against his or her will, and
‘eviction’ has a corresponding meaning.”
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policy is thus “to promote the achievement of a non-racial, integrated society through the
development of sustainable human settlements and [to] promote quality household life.”4
However, housing crisis (comprising backlogs, evictions, removals and inadequate
housing, amongst others) is still a reality in the country. South Africa is still faced with a
“critical nationwide housing backlog.”5 In June 2013, the housing backlog reportedly stood at
2.1 million units (affecting over eight million people).6 In 2012, 54.5 per cent of households
were living in informal settlements.7 In terms of achieving a non-racial integrated society,
South Africa is still seen as a “grossly unequal society in which the (overwhelmingly black)
poor majority population is disproportionately denied adequate housing opportunities and
basic amenities.”8 It has been reported that despite the government’s commitment to realize
housing rights through the range of policies and programmes, “many poor households remain
unable to access some form of adequate housing, often having to live in difficult conditions in
informal settlements and inner city ‘slum buildings’ and subject to the constant risk of
eviction.”9
The government remains committed to addressing the housing crisis and aims to
eliminate the housing backlog by 2030 through building two hundred thousand housing units
per year.10 In 2013, the government indicated that allocation of funding aimed at improving
human settlements has been increased from R26.2 billion to R30.5 billion—this will apply
over three years and includes R1.1 billion to facilitate the upgrading of informal settlements
in mining towns.11 An additional R685 million was allocated to social housing.12 In 2014, the
government committed to building “216 000 houses,” allocated billions of rands for what it
termed special initiatives such as “managing the human settlements function,” “human
settlements Upgrading Support Programme in 53 municipalities” and “settlement upgrading
in mining towns.”13 Over the past five years, government “[s]pending on human settlement
4

Department of Human Settlements, supra note 2.
Ibid.
6
See “Sexwale: Housing Backlog at 2.1m”, News24 (7 June 2013), online: News24
<http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Sexwale-Housing-backlog-at-21m-20130607> [“Sexwale:
Housing Backlog”].
7
This represents an increase, as the figure in 2002 stood at 52.9 per cent of households living in informal
settlements. See Kaelo Engage, “Addressing the Housing Backlog in South Africa”, SANGONeT (11 October
2013), online: SANGONet <http://www.ngopulse.org/article/addressing-housing-backlog-south-africa>.
“Informal settlements,” sometimes referred to as “slums,” are generally comprised of communities or
individuals housed in self-constructed shelters on land that they do not have legal claim to or occupy illegally.
The question of whether slums and informal settlements are the same has been raised by the South African
Constitutional Court, but the majority of the Court found the distinction between slums and informal settlements
to be untenable, (see Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal [2009] 4 BCLR 422
(CC) [Abahlali] at paras 104-06; see also paras 46-48 in which Yacoob J argues the contrary).
8
Michael Clark, “Evictions and Alternative Accommodation in South Africa: An Analysis of the Jurisprudence
and Implications for Local Government” The Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa (November 2013)
at 3, online: Abahlali baseMjondolo <http://abahlali.org/wpcontent/uploads/2008/04/Evictions_Jurisprudence_Nov13.pdf>.
9
Ibid.
10
“Sexwale: Housing Backlog,” supra note 6.
11
Parliament of South Africa, Pravin Gordhan, Budget Speech (27 February 2013) at 27, online: National
Treasury <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2013/speech/speech.pdf>.
12
Ibid. Social housing in the South African context refers to “rental or co-operative housing option for low
income persons at a level of scale and built form which requires institutionalised management and which is
provided by accredited social housing institutions or in accredited social housing projects in designated
restructuring zones” (see Department of Human Settlements, “Social Housing Policy”, Part 3 of the National
Housing Code (2009) at 17). The extent of the poor that can be covered by this housing option is limited to
those with household incomes of between R1 500 and R7 500.
13
Parliament of South Africa, Pravin Gordhan, Budget Speech (26 February 2014) at 6, 16, online: National
Treasury <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2014/speech/speech.pdf> [“Gordhan,
5
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programmes amounted to R70 billion … contributing to 590 000 houses being built.”14 If the
government keeps to its commitment, then this number would increase. At present, it remains
a matter of wait and see.
Notwithstanding the challenges still faced by South Africa in effectively realizing the
right to adequate housing, there are lessons to be learnt from South Africa’s approaches and
strategies to the implementation of housing rights, including how the courts have enforced
housing rights, as access to justice for housing rights is a critical dimension of housing
strategies. The subsequent paragraphs15 consider the approach to recognition of the right,
accountability structures and the courts’ approach to enforcing the right, and the interactions
between litigation and social mobilization in the process of enforcing the right. It should be
emphasized that this paper does not attempt to comprehensively discuss existing housing
rights cases in the South African context. The focus is to highlight trends in relation to
themes identified in the paper, relating to the approaches to enforcing housing rights in South
Africa. In addition to the relationship between litigation and social mobilization mentioned
above, the themes dealt with in the paper include meaningful engagement, reasonableness
concept, approaches to competing interests in the realization of housing rights, judicial
enforcement of housing rights, the impact of litigation and, to a limited extent, its
contribution to social change.16 The trends that can be deduced from these themes are
captured in the relevant sections below as well as in the concluding section.

I. APPROACH TO RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT
Though the socio-economic rights provisions in South Africa’s Constitution of 1996 (the
Constitution) 17 are modelled on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights of 1966 (ICESCR),18 the right to adequate housing provision in the
Constitution is phrased differently. The right to housing is recognised in section 26 of the

Budget Speech (26 February 2014)”]. In February 2015, government indicated that “R290 million [has been]
approved for informal settlement upgrading” in four provinces, namely Mpumalanga, North West, Gauteng,
Northern Cape, Limpopo and the Free State; “One hundred and thirty three (133) informal settlements are being
assessed or prepared for upgrading through the National Upgrade Support Programme;” and “[t]hirty two (32)
settlements are being upgraded and eighty seven (87) housing projects are being implemented across the
prioritised mining towns.” See Jacob Zuma, State of the Nation Address 2015 (12 February 2015), online: South
African Government http://www.gov.za/president-jacob-zuma-state-nation-address-2015 [“Zuma: State of the
Nation Address 2015”].
14
Gordhan, Budget Speech (26 February 2014)” at 11. In February 2015, government indicated that delivery of
housing continued and that “[b]y 30 September 2014, a total number of more than 50 000 houses were delivered
in the subsidy and affordable housing segments.” See “Zuma: State of the Nation Address 2015.”
15
Parts of this paper draw directly from parts of Lilian Chenwi, “Enforcing the Right to Adequate Housing:
Learning from the South Africa Experience” in Subhram Rajkhowa & Stuti Deka, eds, Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Vol. 1 (Guwahati: EBH Publishers, 2012) at 153-191 [Chenwi, “Learning from the South
Africa Experience”].
16
Social change or social transformation, as explained elsewhere, implies transforming the South African
society from one based on economic deprivation to one based on equal distribution of resources. On the one
hand, it means an undoing of the injustices of colonial and apartheid rule in the political, social, economic and
cultural realms. On the other hand, it means the building of a new and better society, founded on democratic
values, social justice and fundamental human rights. See Lilian Chenwi, “Socio-Economic Gains and Losses:
The South African Constitutional Court and Social Change” (2011) 41 Social Change 428 at 429 [Chenwi,
“South African Constitutional Court and Social Change”].
17
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, No 108 of 1996, sections 9, 10, 11, 33, 25(5), 27
[Constitution of South Africa].
18
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty
Series, vol. 993, p 3.
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Constitution, which “has created a powerful constitutional foundation for transforming
evictions law” in the country.19
Before considering the facets of this provision, it is important to note that based on the
principle of interdependency of rights, which the Constitutional Court has acknowledged in
relation to housing rights in the Grootboom case,20 the right to housing has been interpreted
in the light of other constitutional provisions on equality, dignity, life, right to just
administrative action, access to land, right to health care, food, water and social security,
amongst others. Grootboom concerned the right to adequate housing in the context of an
eviction. It involved a group of children and adults who lived in shacks in an informal
settlement. Due to their intolerable conditions, they moved onto private land earmarked for
formal low-cost housing, without the consent of the owner. Following their eviction from the
private land, they camped on a sports field in the area and approached the courts to enforce
their right of access to adequate housing.21
In relation to the interdependency of housing and other rights, the Constitutional
Court held that “the rights in our Bill of Rights are inter-related and mutually supporting.
There can be no doubt that human dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational values of
our society, are denied those who have no food, clothing or shelter,” adding that:
The right of access to adequate housing cannot be seen in isolation. There is a
close relationship between it and the other socio-economic rights. Socioeconomic rights must all be read together in the setting of the Constitution as a
whole. The state is obliged to take positive action to meet the needs of those
living in extreme conditions of poverty, homelessness or intolerable housing.
Their interconnectedness needs to be taken into account in interpreting the socioeconomic rights, and, in particular, in determining whether the state has met its
obligations in terms of them.22

A. PHRASING OF THE RIGHT
The first distinctive feature in terms of the approach to the recognition of the right in South
Africa’s Constitution is the way in which the right to housing is phrased. Section 26(1)
provides for “the right to have access to adequate housing.”23 The Constitution does not
therefore use the language of a “right to adequate housing” envisaged under the ICESCR.
Notwithstanding this difference in phraseology, a “right of access to adequate housing,” as
distinct from the “right to adequate housing” implies that housing entails more than just
“bricks and mortar” and that for a person to have access to adequate housing, they need to
have access to land, appropriate services like water and sewage removal and the house
itself.24

B. PHRASING OF THE STATE’S OBLIGATION
The second distinctive feature is seen in section 26(2) of the Constitution, on the obligation of
the state to “take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to
19

Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights, supra note 1 at 270.
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 at
paras 23-24 [Grootboom].
21
Ibid at paras 3-7.
22
Constitution of South Africa, supra note 17, s 23-24.
23
Ibid [emphasis added].
24
Grootboom, supra note 20 at para 35.
20
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achieve the progressive realisation of this right.” The language of “appropriate” measures,
including legislation, used under the ICESCR is not used in the South African context. The
“reasonable” terminology, as seen subsequently, has contributed to the development of the
“reasonableness approach” to enforcing socio-economic rights.

C. PROHIBITION OF ARBITRARY EVICTIONS
Section 26 goes further in subsection (3) to recognize the right not to be arbitrarily evicted.
This provision prohibits the impairment or prevention of people’s access to housing. It
exhibits special constitutional regard for people’s home. The provision is not a blanket
prohibition on evictions. Thus, evictions may still take place even if it results in
homelessness. The provision, however, includes eviction prerequisites. It requires the state
and other agents that seek to evict people to first obtain a court order, and in granting the
order, the court has to consider “all relevant circumstances.”25
Section 26(3) has given rise to the adoption of other legislation containing more
detailed procedural and substantive requirements to give effect to section 26(3) of the
Constitution. These include the Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act No 19 of 1998 (PIE Act), aimed at ensuring that evictions take place
in a manner that is consistent with the values of the Constitution.26 The PIE Act reinforces the
court order requirement in section 26(3) of the Constitution. Other relevant legislation that
section 26(3) gave rise to is the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA), which
acknowledges the effect of apartheid discriminatory laws and practices; it rendered South
Africans vulnerable to evictions by leaving many of them with no secure tenure of their
homes and the land which they use. Similar to the Constitution, ESTA requires a landowner to
get a court order before evicting unlawful occupiers.27
The difference between ESTA and the PIE Act is that the former provides protection
only to unlawful occupiers who previously had some form of consent or right to occupy the
land in question while the latter provides protection for occupiers who did not have previous
consent or right to occupy the land in question. The PIE Act thus closes a gap in ESTA as well
as provides some legislative texture to guide the courts in determining the approach to
eviction required by the Constitution. It should be noted that there are additional pieces of

An eviction would thus be “arbitrary” if eviction prerequisites are not met. The terminology “arbitrary
eviction” bears the same meaning as “forced evictions,” which the United Nations (UN) Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) defines as “the permanent or temporary removal against their
will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the
provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection” [emphasis added]. See Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 7, Forced Evictions, and the Right to Adequate
Housing, 16th Sess, Annex Agenda Item 4, UN DOC E/1998/22 (1997) at 113 at para 4.
26
For example, section 4(6) of the PIE Act requires that before granting an eviction order, the courts must be of
the opinion “that it is just and equitable to do so, after considering all the relevant circumstances, including the
rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and households headed by women.”
27
ESTA, section 9. An “occupier” is defined in section 1 of ESTA as a person living on land which belongs to
another person, and who has on or since 4 February 1997 had the consent (permission) of the owner or another
right in law to live there. In addition, a person shall be deemed to be an occupier if that person who lived on or
used land on 4 February 1997 with the consent of the owner and such consent was lawfully withdrawn before
the above date but the person continued to live on or use the land. The PIE Act, in section 1, defines an
“unlawful occupier” as “a person who occupies land without the express or tacit consent of the owner or person
in charge, or without any other right in law to occupy such land, excluding a person who is an occupier in terms
of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act, 1997, and excluding a person whose informal right to land, but for
the provisions of this Act, would be protected by the provisions of the Interim Protection of Informal Land
Rights Act, 1996 (Act No. 31 of 1996),” supra note 3.
25
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legislation as well as policies and programmes that form part of the legislative framework on
housing rights.28

D. HOUSING RIGHTS OF CHILDREN AND DETAINED PERSONS
The Constitution also recognizes housing rights in relation to two categories of persons–
children and detained persons. Section 28(1)(c) guarantees children’s right to shelter. What is
distinctive about the provision’s approach is that children’s right to shelter is not qualified by
access, progressive realization or available resources. Notwithstanding this, the Constitutional
Court has clarified that the obligation to provide children and their parents with housing does
not exist independently of the general obligation to take reasonable legislative and other
measures under section 26(2) as well as section 25(5) on access to land.29 Section 28(1)(c)
can be further contrasted with section 26 in that the former uses the term “shelter” while the
latter uses “housing”. Despite the difference in terminology, “shelter” in section 28(1)(c) does
not bear any different meaning from the term “housing” in section 26 –“[h]ousing and shelter
are related concepts and one of the aims of housing is to provide physical shelter. But shelter
is not a commodity separate from housing.”30 Also, the term “embraces shelter in all its
manifestations”—that is, it is not limited to basic shelter alone since the provision does not
include any requirement that it should be basic shelter.31 While the state is the primary duty
bearer under section 26, parents or family bear the primary responsibility to provide shelter
under section 28(1)(c) and only alternatively on the state.32 With regard to detained persons
(including sentenced prisoners), section 35(2)(e) of the Constitution provides for their right to
adequate accommodation at state expense. The provision is also not qualified by the term
access.

E. HOUSING RIGHTS OF OTHER VULNERABLE GROUPS
Though the Constitution, in addition to the protection guaranteed to those faced with
evictions, includes additional housing rights provisions in relation to children and detained
persons, other vulnerable groups are not excluded as the right to housing is guaranteed to
everyone. Other legislation and policy frameworks as well as jurisprudence aim to protect the
housing rights of other vulnerable groups.
Under the housing subsidy programme, for example, there exists individual housing
subsidy for persons with disabilities. Persons with disabilities who earn less than R3 500 per
month as well as meet other criteria can apply for housing subsidy under the housing subsidy
scheme. Persons with disabilities or persons who have financial dependents with disabilities
28

These include, amongst others: the White Paper on Housing, 1994; National Housing Code (revised in 2009);
Housing Act 107 of 1997; Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999; HIV/AIDS Housing Framework, 2003; Housing
subsidy scheme, 1995; Social Housing Policy, 2003; Comprehensive Plan on Sustainable Human Settlements,
2004 (BNG); Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme, 2004; Emergency Housing Programme, 2004; and
Special needs housing (provincial level, as a comprehensive national policy on this is yet to be adopted).
29
Grootboom, supra note 20 at para 74.
30
Ibid at para 73.
31
Ibid. The Court further added that “it does not follow that the Constitution obliges the state to provide shelter
at the most effective or the most rudimentary level to children in the company of their parents.”
32
The Constitutional Court stated in Grootboom (supra note 20) that section 28(1)(c) “does not create any
primary state obligation to provide shelter on demand to parents and their children if children are being cared for
by their parents or families.” But the state has an obligation to “provide the legal and administrative
infrastructure necessary to ensure that children are accorded the protection contemplated by section 28” and to
“provide families with access to land in terms of section 25, access to adequate housing in terms of section 26 as
well as access to health care, food, water and social security in terms of section 27” (at paras 77-78).
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can qualify for extra funds, in addition to the subsidy amount in order to cover any reasonable
accommodation measures. The programme focuses on persons with physical disabilities.33
Also, South Africa’s social housing programme has as one of its target groups, special
needs groups such as persons with disabilities living with HIV/AIDS.34 It should be noted
that whether disability should be read as a separate category or be read in addition to other
vulnerabilities such as HIV/AIDS is unclear. Further, a housing response to HIV/AIDS led to
the adoption in 2003, by the national housing department, of the HIV/AIDS housing
framework, which emphasises the need for housing delivery models to be reviewed in order
to address the housing needs of people living with HIV/AIDS. Lastly, special needs housing
would benefit poor people who are further disadvantaged because they live with disabilities,
or are old and infirm, homeless on the street, infected or affected by HIV/AIDS, victims of
domestic abuse and violence, critically ill or because they are orphans and vulnerable
children. Unfortunately, there is currently no national framework on special needs housing.
However, some provinces have made provision of this.35
With regard to jurisprudence, the courts have sought to protect women’s housing
rights, particularly in relation to their right to property and inheritance rights. The
Constitutional Court has found the customary law rule that women are not fit or competent to
own and administer property to be unconstitutional and constituting a violation of their rights
to dignity and equality.36 It has also found non-recognition of women’s right to ownership,
including access to and control of family property, upon dissolution of a customary marriage,
to be unfair discrimination on grounds of gender.37 A High Court has also, taking into
consideration section 26(1) of the Constitution and the principle of non-discrimination,
overturned a pre-constitutional certificate giving housing rights to the brother of a deceased,
and granted them to the customary-wife of the deceased.38
Having a comprehensive legislative framework in place would only result in real
change on the ground if accountability structures exist to ensure their effective
implementation. The subsequent section thus considers accountability structures in the South
African context that play a role in ensuring effective realisation of the right to adequate
housing, with specific emphasis on the courts.

II. ACCOUNTABILITY STRUCTURES
A. THE COURTS
A socio-economic right that is frequently litigated in South Africa is the right to adequate
housing. Thus, South African courts are key accountability structures and have played a vital
role in enforcing the right to housing. Among the reasons for this frequent housing litigation
are: first, the “pervasive realities of housing backlogs, evictions and removals”; and second,
the fact that “as a negative infringement of the right to housing, impending eviction, does not
See generally, Department of Human Settlements, “Individual Subsidies” Part 3 of the National Housing
Code (2009). It is important to note that the notion of ‘independent living’ in relation to persons with disabilities
is recognised in South Africa’s White Paper on Disability, 1997.
34
Department of Human Settlements, “Social Housing Policy” Part 3 of the National Housing Code (2009) at
30.
35
See Lilian Chenwi, “Taking Those with Special Housing Needs from the Doldrums of Neglect: A Call for a
Comprehensive and Coherent Policy on Special Needs Housing” (2007) 11 L, Democracy and Development 1
at 1-18.
36
Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelisha and Others [2005] 1 BCLR 1 (CC).
37
Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2009] 3 BCLR 243 (CC) at paras 34-36
[Gumede].
38
Nzimande v Nzimande and Another [2005] 1 SA 83 (W).
33
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require the same degree of proactive legal mobilisation that, for example the crisis around
inadequate education, does.”39
Generally, courts can contribute to social change40 and litigation is often pursued by
many as a strategy to bring about social change, especially in relation to issues such as
inequalities and access to services by the poor.41 The contribution of courts to social change
can be direct, where they provide a space for the concerns of marginalized groups to be raised
as legal claims and provide legal redress in ways that have implications for law, policy and
administrative action, as well as protect existing pro-poor institutional arrangements and
reinforcing pro-poor state policies. Where courts enable marginalized groups to effectively
fight for social transformation in other arenas through securing their rights of political
participation and to information and passively provide a platform for claims to be articulated,
then they can contribute, indirectly, to social change.42
Cases on housing rights in South Africa have been brought by individuals as well as
groups, in some instances represented by non-governmental organizations. Apart from
bringing cases, non-governmental organizations or institutions have influenced the approach
to and outcome of housing rights cases through intervening in the cases as amicus curiae. The
rules of the Constitutional Court and the High Court Uniform Rules make provision for
amicus curiae to be admitted in proceedings before the courts. In addition to having an
interest in the proceedings, the submissions to be advanced by the amicus must be relevant to
the proceedings and must raise new contentions that may be useful to the Court.43 Litigating
through amicus briefs has been an important strategy in South African housing rights cases.
The strategy is important in that the amicus can act in the interest of a broader group than
arguing on behalf of one of the parties. The Grootboom case is instructive, as the amici’s
intervention44 shifted the narrow focus of the case (which was on the particular needs of the
community and whether the government could provide housing to the community if they do
not have housing) to the broader implications of the case. The important role of the amici in
the case has been described in the following words:
This amicus intervention swung the debate dramatically. Most of the preceding
arguments had failed to really look socio-economic rights in the eye. There had
been technical arguments and attempts to frame the case in terms of children’s
rights but [the amici] forced us to consider what the nature of the obligations
imposed by these rights was. Although we didn’t accept the entire argument of
the amici, this wasn’t vital. What was important was the nature of the discourse.
It was placing socio-economic rights at the centre of our thinking and doctrine.45

39

Clark, supra note 8 at 3.
Siri Gloppen, “Courts and Social Transformation: An Analytical Framework” in Roberto Gargarella, Pilar
Domingo and Theunis Roux, eds, Courts and Social Transformation in New Democracies: An Institutional
Voice for the Poor? (Aldershot/Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006) 35 at 38 [Gloppen, “Courts and
Social Transformation”].
41
Christopher Mbazira, You are the “Weakest Link” in Realising Socio-Economic Rights: Goodbye - Strategies
for Effective Implementation of Court Orders in South Africa, Socio-Economic Rights Research Series 3 (Cape
Town: Community Law Centre, 2008) at 5-6.
42
Gloppen, “Courts and Social Transformation,” supra note 40.
43
Fose v Minister of Safety and Security [1997] 3 SA 786 (CC) at para 9. See also Hoffmann v South African
Airways [2001] 1 SA 1 (CC) at para 63, where the court describes who an amicus is, and In re Certain Amicus
Curiae Applications: Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others 2002 (5) SA 713
(CC) at para 5, where it clarifies the role of an amicus.
44
The amici were the South African Human Rights Commission and the Community Law Centre intervened in
the Constitutional Court as amici curiae, represented by the Legal Resources Centre.
45
Albie Sachs, “Commenting on the Panel Discussion” (2007) 8 ESR Rev at 18-19.
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In a nutshell, through litigation, the courts have been able to address both individual and
systemic violation. Effective or timely enforcement of the decisions of the courts, however,
remains an ongoing challenge.

B. OTHER ACCOUNTABILITY STRUCTURES
In addition, rental housing tribunals exist that deal with rental housing issues, and are able to
hear cases and issue decisions.
Another relevant institution is the South African Human Rights Commission
(SAHRC), which monitors realization of the right to housing (among other socio-economic
rights) as required by the Constitution.46 Organs of state are required to report yearly on
measures taken to give effect to housing rights.47 The SAHRC also considers complaints, has
looked into questions around access to services in informal settlements, and has monitored
enforcement of decisions, such as the Grootboom decision, where it went as far as submitting
a report to the Constitutional Court on the government’s progress, though a report-back
obligation was not placed on it.
Informal community-based structures or street committees are also seen to play a vital
role in housing, though their role in some communities has consisted mainly of informal
dispute resolution, advice and referral to service providers.48 Such structures in fact “have the
potential to exert far more influence to reduce women’s and girls” vulnerability to domestic
violence and HIV/AIDS’ in the context of access to housing.49
It should be noted that through its role of representing the people and facilitating their
participation in the management of public affairs, Parliament can play an important role in
ensuring effective implementation of housing rights.50 The South African Parliament has an
opportunity to promote implementation of housing rights, as it is required to scrutinize and
oversee government actions.51

III. THE COURTS’ APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT OF
THE RIGHT
I focus in this section on the reasonableness approach to rights adjudication, which is relevant
in relation to the enforcement of positive housing rights duties,52 the emerging concept of
meaningful engagement, and the approach to competing interests in housing cases. It should
be noted that the approach of South African courts has also involved giving due weight to
relevant international law in the enforcement of housing rights. This is made possible through
the Constitution’s recognition of the role of international law in rights implementation.53
46

Constitution of South Africa, supra note 17, section 184(3).
Ibid.
48
See generally Heléne Combrinck & Lilian Chenwi, The Role of Informal Community Structures in Ensuring
Women’s Right to Have Access to Adequate Housing in Langa, Manenberg and Mfuleni (Cape Town:
Community Law Centre, 2007).
49
Ibid at 36.
50
For a general discussion of the South African Parliament’s role to promoting rights and the opportunities
within its mandate to do so, see generally Lilian Chenwi, “Using International Human Rights Law to Promote
Constitutional Rights: The (Potential) Role of the South African Parliament” (2011) 15 L Democracy and
Development 311 at 311-38.
51
Constitution of South Africa, supra note 17, sections 42(3), 55(2).
52
For the court’s approach to enforcing negative duties, see Chenwi,“Learning from the South Africa
Experience,” supra note 15 at 172-77.
53
South African courts have an obligation to consider international law when interpreting the rights in the
Constitution of South Africa, supra note 17. See section 39(1), which also permits the courts to consider foreign
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A. REASONABLENESS APPROACH
The courts have adopted the reasonableness approach as a means of giving leeway to the
political branches of government to make the necessary and appropriate policy choices to
meet their socio-economic rights obligations (thus, including housing rights obligations), so
that the role of courts will then be to consider whether the choices fall within the bounds of
“reasonableness.” Put differently, the approach requires the courts to consider whether the
measures taken are reasonable, as opposed to questioning “whether other more desirable or
favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether public money could have been
well spent.”54 This approach thus limits the potential of housing rights adjudication being
seen as encroaching on the principle of separation of powers, considering that in enforcing
housing rights, like with other socio-economic rights, the courts “scrutinise, evaluate and, if
necessary, order changes to social and economic policy, or the reshaping of … rights and
doctrine to extend access to resources to socio-economically marginalised groups,” a function
that is “traditionally” reserved for “the executive and legislative branches of government.”55
The approach further creates the on-going possibility of challenging socio-economic
deprivations in the light of changing historical, social and economic contexts, as it is context
sensitive and applied on a case-by-case basis.
The reasonableness approach requires that measures aimed at housing rights
implementation must: be comprehensive, coherent, inclusive, balanced, flexible, transparent;
be properly conceived and properly implemented; make short-, medium- and long-term
provision for those in desperate need or in crisis situations and housing needs; not exclude a
significant segment of society; not ignore those whose housing needs are the most urgent and
whose ability to enjoy all human rights is most in peril; clearly set out the responsibilities of
the different spheres of government and ensure that financial and human resources are
available for their implementation; be tailored to the particular context (for example, urban or
rural context) in which they are to apply; take account of different economic levels in the
society, including those who can afford to pay for housing and those who cannot; allow for
meaningful or reasonable engagement with the public or affected people and communities;
and be continuously reviewed.56
In the Grootboom case where this approach was first conceptualized, the Court found
the state’s housing programme not to be reasonable on the basis that it did not make
reasonable provision for people in desperate need of housing, who had no roof over their
head, no access to land, and were living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations. The
Court ordered the state to adopt, implement and supervise a comprehensive and coordinated
programme that addresses effectively the situation of those desperately in need of housing.57
The reasonableness approach has, subsequently, been applied in other housing rights cases58
as well as other socio-economic rights cases. The reasonableness approach is influenced by
law in addition to international law, and section 233 requiring the courts to give preference to any reasonable
interpretation of legislation that is consistent with international law.
54
Grootboom, supra note 20 at para 41.
55
Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights, supra note 1 at 67.
56
Grootboom, supra note 20 at paras 37, 42-44; President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd and Others [2005] 8 BCLR 786 (CC) at para 49 [Modderklip], Port Elizabeth
Municipality v Various Occupiers [2004] 12 BCLR 1268 (CC) at para 19 [PE Municipality]; Occupiers of 51
Olivia Road and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others [2008] 5 BCLR 475 (CC) at paras 17-18 [Olivia
Road], Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others [2009] 9 BCLR 847
(CC) at para 378 [Joe Slovo].
57
Grootboom, supra note 20 at para 99.
58
See Chenwi, “Learning from the South Africa Experience,” supra note 15 at 171-72.
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progressive realization and the availability of resources. The approach, arguably, has some
elements of minimum core obligations.59 It accentuates the obligation to not leave people in
desperate need without any form of assistance, to take immediate interim measures of relief
for those in desperate need, and the obligation to, at the very minimum, meet short-term
needs, thus essentially implying recognition of minimum core.60 It is worth noting that
requiring a state to take immediate measures or to meet short-term pressing needs, does not
release the state of its obligation to provide for medium and long-term needs. South Africa’s
housing rights jurisprudence points to the fact that providing temporary alternative housing61
does not relieve the state of its obligation to make provision for permanent housing, as
temporary alternative housing is provided pending the provision of suitable permanent
housing, in consultation with those involved.62

B. MEANINGFUL ENGAGEMENT63
The notion of meaningful engagement is relevant to housing rights enforcement and has been
referred to mainly in housing rights cases. It refers to mandatory consultation processes
between the parties to a case, ordered by courts, in the course of enforcing housing rights as
well as socio-economic rights in general. The approach of ordering meaningful engagement
has been used in the process of adopting and implementing remedial measures to realize
housing rights.64 Through the use of meaningful engagement, the courts exercise their
59

It should be noted that South African courts have, thus far, been reluctant to endorse the minimum core
obligations approach (see, for example, Grootboom, supra note 20 at paras 27-29). The Constitutional Court has
stated that “it is not possible to determine a minimum threshold for the progressive realisation of the right to
adequate housing without first identifying the needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of such a right.” This is
because groups are differently situated and have varying social needs. However, “there may be cases where it
may be possible and appropriate to have regard to the content of a minimum core obligation to determine
whether the measures taken by the State are reasonable” (see Grootboom, supra note 20 at paras 27-29, 32-33).
60
See, generally, Sandra Liebenberg, “Socio-Economic Rights: Revisiting the Reasonableness
Review/Minimum Core Debate” in Stu Woolman & Michael Bishop, eds, Constitutional Conversations
(Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2008) 303 at 303-29. Also see, David Bilchitz, Poverty Reduction and
Fundamental Rights: The justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007) at 149, and Redson Edward Kapindu, “From the Global to the Local: The Role of
International Law in the Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa,” (2009) (Paper for the SocioEconomic Rights Project, Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape) at 46, online: Community
Law Centre <http://communitylawcentre.org.za/projects/socio-economicrights/Research%20and%20Publications/Research%20Series/From%20the%20global%20to%20the%20local%2
0-%20The%20role%20of%20international%20law%20in%20the%20enforcement%20of%20socioeconomic%20rights%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf/download>.
61
“Temporary housing” is used to refer to housing that is basic, simple in form and easy to construct. The South
African Supreme Court of Appeal has made it clear that any alternative temporary accommodation provided
should consist of a place where the evicted persons can live without the threat of another eviction and in a
waterproof structure that is secure against the elements and with access to basic services such as basic
sanitation, water and refuse services (see City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others [2007] 6
BCLR 643 (SCA) at para 78(2.1) [Rand Properties].
62
Lilian Chenwi, “Monitoring the Progressive Realisation of Socio-Economic Rights: Lessons from the United
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the South African Constitutional Court”
(Research paper for Studies in Poverty and Inequality Institute, 2010) [published] at 37.
63
This section draws directly from parts of Lilian Chenwi, “‘Meaningful engagement’ in the Realisation of
Socio-Economic Rights: The South African Experience” (2011) 26 SAPL 128 at 128-56, which provides a more
detailed understanding of the concept, highlights relevant jurisprudence that has referred to meaningful
engagement and identifies challenges in the various approaches to the use of meaningful engagement.
64
The constitutional basis for meaningful engagement is section 152(1), on the obligation to provide democratic
and accountable government for local communities, provide services in sustainable manner and encourage
involvement of communities and community organizations in matters of local government; section 7(2) on the
obligations to respect, protect, promote and fulfil rights; the Preamble’s recognition of the need to improve the
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remedial powers in a way that not only allows for democratic processes of consultation and
dialogue in housing rights enforcement but also mitigates the effects of a negative court
ruling. Also, individuals and communities can influence and shape, inter alia, policies and
priority setting in relation to the provision of housing through meaningful engagement. The
ordering of meaningful engagement is important as participation is a fundamental,
constitutional right in itself, an important aspect of democracy, and an important component
of efforts to uplift and empower the poor in society.
Meaningful engagement is guided by the following principles: the parties must act
reasonably, in good faith, proactively, with honesty and equality of voice for all concerned,
and understand and accommodate each other’s concerns; the process should be transparent
and not be shrouded in secrecy—complete and accurate account of the process has to be
provided; the engagement process must be tailored to particular circumstances, be structured
and consistent, be coherent and adequate, and be done both individually and collectively; ad
hoc engagement may be appropriate for small municipalities where an eviction or two might
occur each year but is inappropriate in large municipalities; the needs of particular occupiers
in relation to alternative accommodation should be given specific consideration in the
process; the engagement process should, preferably, be managed by careful and sensitive
people in order to ensure meaningful participation by poor, vulnerable or illiterate people;
structures that are staffed by competent and sensitive council workers who are skilled in
engagement must be put in place; “civil society organisations that support the people[’s]
claims should preferably facilitate the engagement process in every possible way,” and a topdown approach where individuals and communities are not involved as partners in the
decision-making process itself should not be used in the engagement process.65
Examples of instructive cases in relation to understanding the approach of ordering
meaningful engagement are Olivia Road and Joe Slovo.66Olivia Road was a case in which
residents of an allegedly unsafe building in Johannesburg approached the Court to halt their
proposed eviction. The constitutionality of provisions of the National Building Regulations
and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (NBRSA) that empowered local authorities to issue a
notice to occupiers to vacate premises when they deem it necessary for the safety of any
person was at issue.67 If an occupier fails to comply with the notice, it will constitute a
criminal offence for which the occupier can be fined up to R100 for each day of
noncompliance.68 The residents argued, among other things, that the relevant authorities had
not fulfilled their constitutional obligations to progressively realize the right to have access to
adequate housing and that their right to just administrative action has been breached due to
the failure to afford them a hearing prior to taking a decision to evict them. The case thus
involved reconciling respect for the inadequate accommodation which people living on the
margins have secured for themselves, and the statutory powers and duties of local authorities
to ensure that conditions of accommodation do not constitute a threat to the safety of these
persons.
Joe Slovo, on the other hand, was a case in which a large and settled community (an
informal settlement) in Cape Town approached the Court to halt their eviction from their
homes in order to facilitate housing development, aimed at upgrading the informal settlement.
The community were not against the upgrade itself but the approach to it and concerns
quality of life and free potential of people; section 26(2)’s reasonable measure obligation and the need to dignity
and life.
65
PE Municipality, supra note 56 at paras 30, 39; Olivia Road, supra note 56 at paras 14-15, 19-21; Joe Slovo,
supra note 56 at paras 244, 301-02, 304, 378.
66
It should be noted that the courts’ reference to engagements is not limited to the two cases considered here.
67
NBRSA, section 12(4)(b).
68
Ibid, section 12(6).
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around housing allocations following the development, and the reality that not all of the
residents would benefit from the houses that would be built in the settlement. The
government was not willing to do an in situ upgrade, which would not imply eviction.
In Olivia Road, the Constitutional Court ordered meaningful engagement after
hearing arguments but before handing down its judgment.69 The parties subsequently reached
a comprehensive settlement and submitted it to the Court.70 The Court’s judgment was issued
subsequent to this agreement. The challenge with ordering engagement before the judgment
is issued is that the parties go into the engagement without any knowledge of their
entitlements and without any guarantees of respect and vindication of their rights in the
process and outcome. This could result in an unsuccessful engagement due to participatory
disparity stemming from the unequal bargaining power between the state and disadvantaged
groups. However, this was not the case in Olivia Road as this effect was mitigated (in fact
eliminated) by the lawyers that represented the occupiers during the engagement process.
Notwithstanding, it is important to define the normative parameters so that the engagement
process does not become a process of settling a local dispute that is “normatively empty” and
“unprincipled.”71
Conversely, meaningful engagement in Joe Slovo was ordered as one of the
mitigating aspects to render the eviction just and equitable.72 The structured order requiring
engagement, including the Court’s detailed specifications on the alternative accommodation
to be provided upon eviction, had a positive impact as seen below.73 What Joe Slovo confirms
is that the approach of ordering meaningful engagement would be adequate where normative
parameters have been substantively articulated and a reporting obligation placed on the
parties in relation to the engagement process.

C. APPROACH TO COMPETING INTERESTS74
In the implementation of housing rights, a number of interests could compete with each other,
especially in the context of evictions. The competing interests include housing rights versus
property rights and rights of landowners, and the government’s constitutional obligations
versus the interests of surrounding communities. The approach of South African courts has
been to balance these interests rather than prioritize one over the other. In fact, one of the
objectives of the PIE Act has been to strike a balance between a landowner’s right to evict
unlawful occupiers and the occupiers’ right to have access to adequate housing and be
protected from arbitrary eviction.
The case of Grootboom acknowledges the fact that where there’s a clash between
housing and property rights, courts have to ensure a balance between both rights and the state
has a duty to seek to satisfy both rights.75
In the Kyalami Ridge case,76 the Constitutional Court held that the interests of both
the flood victims and the environmental and property interests of the residents have to be
69

Interim Order, dated 30 August 2007, reproduced in Olivia Road, supra note 56 at para 5.
Agreement, signed on 29 October 2007, referred to in Olivia Road, supra note 56 at paras 24-26.
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Sandra Liebenberg, “Engaging the Paradoxes of the Universal and Particular in Human Rights Adjudication:
The Possibilities and Pitfalls of ‘Meaningful Engagement’” (2012) 2 AHRLJ 1 at 19.
72
Joe Slovo, supra note 56 at paras 7(5), 338.
73
Liebenberg, supra note 71 at 26.
74
This section draws directly from parts of Lilian Chenwi, “Putting Flesh on the Skeleton: South African
Judicial Enforcement of the Right to Adequate Housing of Those Subject to Evictions” (2008) 8 HRLR 105 at
134-36.
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taken into account in the decision-making process.77 The case concerned the decision of the
government to house a group of flood victims on land belonging to it. Severe floods displaced
people in Alexandra Township. As a temporary measure, the government wanted to assist the
affected people by establishing a transit camp on state-owned land, with the aim of moving
the people to permanent housing once it became available. This plan was made without
discussions with residents near the area of the transit camp. The residents’ association
challenged the government’s plan on the ground that it was not supported by legislation, and
that it contravened a town planning scheme, land and environmental legislation. The
challenge was brought by residents in the vicinity. The Court found the decision by
government to establish a temporary camp to be lawful as it was intended to give effect to its
constitutional obligation to provide access to adequate housing.
In PE Municipality78 the Constitutional Court emphasised the need to consider the
interest of both landowners and unlawful occupiers. The case concerned an eviction
application by the Port Elizabeth Municipality against a group of adults and children, who
had illegally occupied private undeveloped land within the municipality’s jurisdiction. The
municipality had argued that giving alternative land to the occupiers concerned would be
preferential treatment, would disrupt the existing housing programme, and would be “queuejumping.” The Court observed that despite the complexities in balancing interests, courts
should not establish a hierarchical arrangement between the different interests involved—they
cannot privilege in an abstract and mechanical way property rights over the housing rights of
those affected. Instead, courts must “balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in as just a
manner as possible taking account of all the interests involved and the specific factors
relevant in each case.”79
The clash between property rights and housing rights was evident in the Modderklip
case.80 The case concerned a private landowner’s efforts to execute an eviction order granted
by the High Court against a community occupying its land. The landowner was unsuccessful
in getting various organs of the state to assist him in enforcing the eviction order. The
Supreme Court of Appeal in the case was of the view that the state’s failure to provide
alternative accommodation to the occupiers upon eviction not only breached the occupier’s
housing rights but also the landowner’s rights.81 The Constitutional Court found it
unreasonable to force the landowner to bear the state’s burden of providing the occupiers
with accommodation and that the state’s failure to provide alternative accommodation to the
occupiers breached the landowner’s right to an effective remedy,82 thus confirming that rights
have to be balanced.

IV. OUTCOME OF HOUSING RIGHTS LITIGATION: THE
GROOTBOOM, OLIVIA ROAD AND JOE SLOVO EXAMPLES
If litigation is to result in improvement of the rights situation on the ground and effect social
change, the relevant authorities must comply with judicial decisions and political action must
be taken to implement court orders.83 Thus, one of the variables that can affect the
transformative potential of litigation is the question of compliance, specifically the extent to
77

Ibid at paras 103,105-06.
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Ibid at paras 23, 37.
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Modderklip, supra note 56.
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Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boedery (Pty) Ltd; President of the
Republic of South Africa and Others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd [2004] 8 BCLR 821 (SCA) at para 52.
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Modderklip, supra note 56 at para 45, 51.
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which court decisions are politically authoritative and whether political branches comply with
them and implement and reflect them in legislation and policies.84 Litigation can thus fail to
drive social change or drive it as rapidly as expected if political branches fail to effectively
implement judicial decisions or are slow in implementing them. In the South African context,
as explained elsewhere,85 though the Constitutional Court has laid down a number of propoor principles and rules, compliance with these has been an issue of concern, with the
consequence being that successful litigants are unable to benefit fully from the orders arising
from their victories. Consequently, they continue to live in poverty and socio-economic
deprivation.
The subsequent sections consider the outcome of three key housing rights cases in
South Africa. A consideration of the outcome of these cases provides an indication of the
extent to which they have effected real changes on the ground and real social change.

A. GROOTBOOM
The Grootboom decision has been hailed for its use of international law, as a great victory for
the homeless and landless people of South Africa, and for its contribution to the development
of the jurisprudence on the nature of the state’s obligation to progressively realize a specific
socio-economic right.86 However, there were delays in the enforcement of the decision,
attributed to the community’s lack of understanding of legal and technical matters relating to
housing; lack of skills (as most members of the community are illiterate); inadequate
communication and consultancy between government and the community leading to nonconsultative decision making and a lack of understanding by the community of the
government’s plans; and non-maintenance of services provided, leading to their deterioration,
among other challenges.87
Before the case was decided, there was an initial settlement (the interlocutory order
initiated by the government), which took months to be put in place.88 Though implementation
of this initial settlement was slow, it did result in some improvement of the conditions of the
community.
Further, in 2004, the Emergency Housing Programme89 was adopted in response to
the court’s order, which provides a safety net in situations where communities are faced with
84

To understand this point in the context of the transformative potential of courts, see ibid at 36-37, 43, where
differences in courts’ transformation performance is explained in terms of variations at the four stages of
litigation—voice, responsiveness, capability, compliance. Also, at 54-55, Gloppen identifies factors that
influence compliance with judicial decisions, some of which have accounted for the slow implementation of
court decisions in South Africa as seen subsequently. Gloppen identifies the following: (a) factors within the
judicial system such as the professionalism and capacity of the judges to devise acceptable legal remedies, and
whether the decisions include enforcement mechanisms such as mandatory or supervisory orders or contempt of
court orders in cases of noncompliance; and (b) factors outside the legal system such as the political and
economic context, the legitimacy of the court in various sectors of the society, and the capacity of the
government to implement the decisions.
85
Chenwi, “South African Constitutional Court and Social Change,” supra note 16 at 440.
86
Kameshni Pillay, “Implementing Grootboom” (2002) 3 ESR Rev 13 at 13.
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For more discussion on the challenges in enforcing the Grootboom orders, see generally South African
Human Rights Commission, “Housing: 5th Economic and Social Rights Report 2002/3” (21 June 2004), online:
Kameshni
Pillay
SAHRC
<http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Reports/5th_esr_environment.pdf>;
“Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights” (2002) 6 L,
Democracy and Development 255 at 255.
88
Gilbert Marcus and Steven Budlender, A Strategic Evaluation of Public Interest Litigation in South Africa
(The Atlantic Philanthropies, 2008) at 61 [Marcus and Budlender, Strategic Evaluation].
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Department of Human Settlements, “Emergency Housing Programme”, Part 3 of the National Housing Code
Vol. 4 (2009).
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evictions that will leave them in crisis. In particular, the programme aims to assist groups of
people faced with urgent housing problems, such as evictions, floods, and fires, by providing
temporary assistance in the form of municipal grants. Such grants would enable the
Municipality to respond to emergencies by providing secure access to land, boosting
infrastructure and basic services, and improving access to shelter through voluntary
relocation and resettlement. Though the implementation of the programme is slow, the
existence of the programme increases the possibility of those in desperate need to receive
relief or assistance from the government, thus providing a safety net in situations where
communities are faced with evictions that will leave them in crisis. Prior to Grootboom, the
government had shown no sign of putting such a programme in place.
Other outcomes linked to the case include the adoption of the Upgrading of Informal
Settlements Programme90 and the allocation of a fixed percentage of the annual national
housing budget, by National Treasury Department, for the provision of emergency housing
services (what has been referred to as “the Grootboom allocation”).91 Also, the
reasonableness approach, first conceived in the case, has been useful in enforcing socioeconomic rights92 and the constitutional duty to provide temporary alternative has been
reinforced and strengthened in subsequent housing rights cases. Hence, despite delays in
providing permanent housing to the community and upgrading the informal settlement, the
case has had some positive outcome.
It must be noted that the Constitutional Court, in the case, did not make any specific
order for the community to be given permanent housing. Therefore, the fact that Irene
Grootboom died without having received permanent housing or the general delay in provision
or non-provision of permanent housing to the community cannot be seen as a drawback in
terms of enforcement of the remedy in the case. Notwithstanding this, her situation is
reflective of the state of housing issues in South Africa, and the human cost of poverty and
social change. Subsequent to her death, her family received a house. Also, some of the
community members have been relocated to permanent housing.

B. OLIVIA ROAD
The agreement in Olivia Road that was reached following the ordered engagement contained
interim measures to secure the safety of the building and provide the occupiers with
alternative accommodation in the inner City of Johannesburg. The interim measures to
improve the conditions in the two buildings pending relocation to the alternative
accommodation included the provision, at the City’s expense, of toilets, potable water, waste
disposal services, fire extinguishers, and a once-off operation to clean and sanitize the
properties. The City and the occupiers agreed that the alternative accommodation would
consist of, at least, security against eviction, access to sanitation, access to potable water, and
access to electricity for heating, lighting and cooking. It was further agreed that, once
Department of Human Settlements, “Upgrading of Informal Settlement”, Part 3 of the National Housing Code
Vol. 4 (2009).
91
Malcolm Langford & Steve Kahanovitz, “Just Tick the Boxes: Judicial Enforcement in South Africa” (2010)
Think Piece/Emerging Paper 7 [unpublished], online: International Network for Economic, Social & Cultural
Rights
<http://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/Langford_and_Kahanovitz_-_South_Africa_0.pdf>
[Langford & Kahanovitz, “Judicial Enforcement in South Africa”].
92
The Grootboom decision has generally had a huge impact on subsequent socio-economic rights cases through
their reliance on the principles laid down in Grootboom. For example, in the Minister of Health and Others v
Treatment Action Campaign [2002] 5 SA 721 (CC) [TAC], the reasonableness review approach was used to
achieve a major victory in the provision of drugs for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of
HIV/AIDS. The case concerned a challenge to the state’s policy on the prevention of mother-to-child
transmission of HIV, which was challenged as inconsistent with the right to have access to health care services.
90
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relocated, the occupiers would occupy the temporary shelter until suitable permanent housing
solutions were developed for them. It was also agreed that the nature and location of
permanent housing options would be developed by the City in consultation with the
occupiers.
Despite the positive outcomes, with the question of permanent housing still to be
discussed, Olivia Road, however, misses the opportunity to pronounce on potentially
transformative issues such as whether the right to housing requires a consideration of location
in the provision of alternative accommodation and whether the municipality’s inner city
housing plans’ failure to make provision for the poor was unconstitutional. The Court did not
develop the right to housing jurisprudence beyond its decision in Grootboom and therefore
“failed to tackle the policies and practices at the core of the vulnerability of poor people
living in locations earmarked for commercial developments” and “to establish critical rightsbased safeguards for extremely vulnerable groupings.”93

C. JOE SLOVO
The ordering of structured meaningful engagement as a condition for eviction (including the
detailed specifications on the alternative accommodation to be provided to the residents) had
a positive impact, as the government has subsequently decided to proceed with in-situ
upgrading of the Joe Slovo settlement,94 an approach to the upgrading that the government as
well as the Court initially saw as unattainable. Following the judgment, the residents now
knew their legal entitlements, and were thus more empowered than before the litigation
process. The eviction order has been discharged because no engagement took place, the
possibility of an engagement was unlikely, and the government has chosen to pursue in situ
upgrading of the settlement. The report-back requirement in the engagement order was thus
useful in providing the court with an opportunity to reconsider its initial conclusions in light
of the subsequent delays and change in circumstances.

V. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN LITIGATION AND SOCIAL
MOBILIZATION
Though litigation has been effective in enforcing housing rights in South Africa, it is
certainly not sufficient in achieving social change (of course, noting that there could be
instances where properly used litigation results in marginalized or poor groups achieving
successes and impacts). This is because litigation can either lead to improvements, limited or
no improvements, in the lives of the poor. In the South African context, the weakness of
remedies ordered or the normative construction of socio-economic rights has resulted in
litigation being followed by minimal or no improvements in some instances, as the previous
section illustrates.
Litigation, in itself, is therefore generally seen, not only in the South African context
but, for example, the Indian context as well, as insufficient to bring about social change.95
Social mobilization, advocacy and education are also crucial in ensuring effective
implementation of housing rights. In fact, a combination of strategies is crucial. It is also
stated that “rights generally are most effectively asserted by social movements” and litigation
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cannot be used to substitute social mobilization on rights issues, particularly because the
assertion of rights has to take place inside and outside the courts.96 Rather, “it is the
combination of social mobilisation and litigation that has the greatest potential to alter laws
and policies” and these are thus seen as “complementary strategies.”97 It should be noted that,
while litigation and social mobilization can be seen as complementary, they can also be in
tension “if recourse to the courts leads to resources being devoted only to litigation, at the
expense of other strategies, leading to demobilization” and “lawyers and intellectuals taking
the lead in devising strategies and making key decisions, at the expense of decision-making
by communities or their representatives.”98 Therefore, litigation needs to be part of a broader
strategy to achieve social mobilization and social change; otherwise, the social impact of
litigation becomes limited.99
A key case in the South African context on the interactions between litigation and
social mobilization is the TAC case.100 Though this case is not specifically on housing rights
(hence the reason why I do not discuss it further here), it is important to note the case as a
good example, illustrating the assertion of rights inside and outside the courts. The strategy in
the case is summed up in the following words: “The TAC saw its litigation as one facet of its
much bigger political fight over the availability of AIDS drugs and for years before the case
commenced, the TAC had been engaging in substantial social mobilization of its members
and the broader public in an effort to put pressure on the government.”101
Social mobilization in the context of housing rights has been limited until recently.
When the Grootboom case commenced, there was some social mobilization and protest prior
to the launch of litigation, which turned out to be weak and temporary. The Grootboom
situation can, however, be contrasted with the TAC one in that, social mobilization in the
former dissolved once litigation commenced, resulting in a weakening of the community’s
initially strong position in actively asserting and enforcing their rights. TAC mobilization, on
the other hand, commenced prior to litigation and even continued post litigation in order to
ensure effective enforcement of the judgment.
With the increased activism of Abahlali baseMjondolo, a shack-dwellers’ movement,
which was born out of the concern over lack of participatory democracy at the local level and
a shortage of formal housing and land, the solidification of social mobilization in the housing
context is becoming evident. This movement advocates for access to land and housing, access
to basic services such as water, sanitation and electricity for informal settlement dwellers, and
meaningful participatory democracy. The movement has been faced with resistance from the
government, which has prohibited protest marches, and has unlawfully arrested and tortured
members of the movement, among other attacks.102 The movement has made significant
inroads in relation to the protection of housing rights. Its strategy is rights-based, counterhegemonic, self-empowerment and effective organization.
For example, it successfully challenged the KwaZulu-Natal Elimination and
Prevention of Re-emergence of Slums Act 6 of 2007 (Slums Act), legislation aimed at
eliminating and preventing the re-emergence of slums.103 The Act encouraged evictions,
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made it mandatory for landowners to institute eviction proceedings, and made opposing
evictions a criminal offence. It required the Member of the Executive Council for Local
Government, Housing and Traditional Affairs (MEC) of the province of KwaZulu-Natal to,
through a notice, obligate an owner or person in charge of land or a building to institute
eviction proceedings against unlawful occupiers, with this obligation shifting to the
municipality where the owner fails to comply.104 The Constitutional Court found this to be
inconsistent with section 26(2) of the Constitution and other housing and eviction legislation
and polices, such as the PIE Act that does not compel an owner to evict unlawful
occupiers.105 The compulsion “erodes and considerably undermines the protections against
arbitrary institution of eviction proceedings” and the MEC’s power is “overbroad and
irrational,” as well as “seriously invasive of the protections against arbitrary evictions” in
section 26(2) of the Constitution read with the PIE Act and national housing legislation.106
This case is not just a victory to shack dwellers but to other vulnerable groups faced with
evictions, considering its emphasis on the requirements of meaningful engagement. State
authorities have thus been forced to consult with shack dwellers in relation to housing
development and issues. The movement is widely regarded as the most successful local
movement.107
Though social mobilization in the housing sector commenced on a dire note with the
Grootboom case, the use of social mobilization and litigation in subsequent housing cases, as
seen from the Abahlali example above and as explained below, has had positive impact,
including in the post-litigation phase. Of course, there is still need to strengthen the use of
litigation and social mobilization as combined strategies in the housing sector.
In addition to the Abahlali example, the degree of mobilization of social movements
or NGOs or communities has affected enforcement of subsequent housing rights decisions in
South Africa. For example, the communities in the Modderklip, Olivia Road and Joe Slovo
cases were highly organized, worked closely with social movements, NGOs and lawyers, had
governance structures that were representative, hardworking and organized. This contributed
to them achieving more than the Grootboom community, which was divided.108
It should be noted that mobilization is also relevant in relation to influencing policy
development. For example, based on first-hand experience, groups working on women’s
rights and domestic violence issues have been able to mobilize and coordinate their efforts in
their engagement with municipalities, such as the City of Cape Town, on access to housing
for women, especially those faced with domestic violence and on an effective special needs
housing policy.

VI. CONCLUSION
Litigation, or the threat of litigation, can force a government to reconsider its housing
policies. However, though litigation has been a key strategy in South Africa, it is not the only
strategy in enforcing the right. Advocacy, social mobilization, education, improved
participation (meaningful engagement) are also relevant. Attention must be paid not only to
courts but the role of civil society as well. It is important to employ different strategies to
enforcing the right to housing. Ensuring effective implementation of the judgment is often a
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greater challenge. The general slow pace of implementation of court orders in socioeconomic rights cases in South Africa has resulted in calls for the use of structural interdicts
as a means of ensuring compliance.109 While enforcement of decisions has been a problem in
some cases, it has been enforced within a comparatively short period of time in others, for
example, in Olivia Road and Modderklip. Giving meaning to the positive obligations while
upholding rights at the same time, and finding appropriate remedies are also challenges.
Resistance from the government could limit efforts but as the Abahlali movement illustrates,
such resistance can be countered by persistence from civil society.
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